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Introduction 
 
In the years following the Second World War an intense debate developed 
among political philosophers concerning what was thought to be a 
profound crisis of political theory. This lively debate contained a number 
of interesting criticisms of liberalism, which was considered partly 
responsible for not only the crisis of political theory but also the state of 
decline in Western civilisation, as witnessed by war and totalitarianism. 
Beyond the extent to which they seem relevant or convincing today, these 
criticisms formed an important part of contemporary political philosophy 
and identify a number of unresolved issues within the liberal tradition. 
They therefore represent an interesting starting point in investigating how 
a revival of liberalism occurred in the post-war years; and more generally 
when trying to better understand liberalism, that is, a tradition of thought 
as rich as it is diverse – and for this reason often contradictory. 
The purpose of this chapter is to radically challenge the thesis of 
liberalism’s responsibility for the “ethical crisis” of Western civilisation 
and to argue that the classical liberalism of the twentieth century is a 
political philosophy that confronts these issues by giving them a new 
vision and definition, thus opening a new important page in the philosophy 
of politics. 1 Here I attempt to analyse how classical liberal theory, far 
from being a relativist position, is an effort to elaborate on a political 
philosophy which offers a response to the classic questions of that 
discipline. 
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to stress the rediscovery of some of the old roots of liberalism, which had been 
partially lost. On this issue see Antonio Masala, Crisi e rinascita del liberalismo 
classico, Pisa, ETS, 2012.  
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The Decay of Political Philosophy 
 
The debate on the (alleged) crisis of political theory took place mainly in 
the United States, but began among German-speaking philosophers who 
had taken refuge in the new world during the Nazi period, bringing with 
them what has been called the “Weimar conversation”.2 The influence of 
these scholars in American academia was remarkable, and in some ways 
continues today. Some of its most influential names were Leo Strauss, Eric 
Voegelin, and Hannah Arendt, but also the American philosophers 
Sheldon Wolin and John Hallowell. These thinkers, albeit in very different 
forms, agreed on the idea that a long process of decay was occurring in 
Western culture. If Western civilisation wanted to ensure that the defeat of 
totalitarianism was not just a fortuitous circumstance, it had to change 
course and deal with the “philosophical” roots of that evil. 
These thinkers were united in their criticism of liberalism, considering 
it responsible for the loss of Western moral values, values without which it 
would be impossible to achieve the “good political order”. The criticisms 
against (modern) liberalism consisted precisely in considering it 
“indifferent” to the problem of ethics and guilty of thinking that the 
(political) problem of civil society could simply be resolved by “economic 
means”.3 In this view, liberalism had forgotten that without a reference to 
values and without the aim of improving humankind, even from a spiritual 
perspective, co-existence within society would be impossible. In (modern) 
liberalism, social and individual virtue was no longer an indispensable 
prerequisite for order, which would simply arise from free interaction 
among individuals and from the capacity of the market – and society with 
it – to self-regulate. This unlimited confidence in the automatic 
mechanism of the market and the weakening of reference to values would, 
according to critics of liberalism, pave the way for various forms of 
relativism, rationalism and positivism, which would inevitably lead to 
totalitarianism, the tyranny of the contemporary world.  
The philosopher who most vigorously supported the idea that 
liberalism was responsible for the crisis of political philosophy – which 
coincided with the crisis of the contemporary world – was Leo Strauss. In 
his opinion, the “Jewish problem” was the clearest example of liberalism’s 
lack of a solution to what he called the “political problem” par excellence, 
namely the human problem. The Weimar Republic had attempted to solve 
the Jewish issue by following the principles of liberalism, which meant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a detailed account see John G. Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory: The 
Genealogy of an American Vocation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
3 Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1988 [1959], p. 49. 
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granting Jews full civil and political rights as German citizens of Jewish 
faith. Since religion is relegated to private affairs within liberal 
democracy, religious differences were thought to be irrelevant and 
therefore Jewish citizens should be considered equal citizens just as 
everyone else. Yet Strauss believed that this was not a real solution since 
legal equality had no effect on feelings towards Jews among other citizens. 
Unable to prevent discrimination within the private sphere – as non-
interference in this sphere formed the basis of liberalism – the collapse of 
the Weimar Republic and the rise of national-socialism was a logical 
consequence. For Strauss, this development indicated that liberalism was 
unable to resolve the “political problem”.4 
Strauss’ argument was therefore that, contrary to liberal claims, it is 
insufficient to put in place universal and non-discriminatory rules in order 
to achieve good political order. What is needed is also giving content to 
such norms meant to distinguish between good and evil: Therefore virtue 
had to be instilled in the hearts of citizens before being codified through 
law. A liberal democratic political regime which prohibits public 
discrimination but allows it in the private sphere – for instance because it 
respects the ideas of those who discriminate – rests on a foundation of 
sand and is therefore constantly exposed to the risk of being replaced by a 
different system, potentially leading to great crimes. The solution to the 
political problem should therefore not be sought only in legal or 
institutional arrangements, but in principles that must be internalised by 
mankind before being expressed through formal laws. 
While not disregarding the numerous difficulties in achieving such a 
development, Strauss sought to identify a solution through a re-proposition 
of natural law, which rejects the idea that all laws may be considered 
positive laws, that is, as products of legislators. It is in fact necessary to 
hold an archetypal idea of right and wrong, which must be independent of 
positive law and thereby allows us to judge the value of positive law. This 
objective now seems to have been discarded by contemporary liberalism. 
Due to its “personal union” with the value free social sciences (modern 
political science), contemporary liberalism accepts the Weberian 
distinction between facts and values, consequently considering all values 
worth of respect and therefore abandoning the defence of natural law. The 
value free social sciences have the sole task of studying the relationship 
between means and ends, but explicitly refuse to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate ends and therefore between good and bad. 
It follows that our principles have our own preferences as their sole 
foundation and that these preferences determine our choices, all with equal 
legitimacy. The only ultimate principle to recognise is the “respect for 
diversity or individuality” and every other limit has to be rejected. Since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern, London/New York, Basic 
Books, 1968, especially pp. 230-31. 
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natural law imposed limits on individuals, liberalism had ultimately 
rejected it in favour of “a cult of individuals with no limits”. The 
consequence was to reverse the concept of tolerance, which “appeared as a 
value or ideal among many, and not as intrinsically superior to its 
opposite. In other words, intolerance appeared as a value equal in dignity 
to tolerance.”5. Absolute tolerance is unachievable, since it is destined to 
give rise to its opposite. 
According to Strauss political philosophy had ceased to reflect on what 
should be the purposes of mankind and what should be the “best political 
order”. Liberal political philosophy had itself strongly contributed to this 
compromised stance toward mankind’s aims, first with Hobbes, who 
Strauss considered the true father of both liberalism and totalitarianism, 
and then with Locke. Locke, following the teachings of Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, believed that the problem of order must be solved by appealing to 
the passions and desires of men. He identified the most salient desire on 
which to rely not in the passion for glory (Machiavelli), nor in the desire 
for self-preservation as in the fear of a violent death (Hobbes), but rather 
in self-preservation understood as emancipation from poverty and the 
“ability to purchase”. Strauss wrote: “Here we have an utterly selfish 
passion whose satisfaction does not require the spilling of any blood and 
whose effect is the improvement of the lot of all. In other words, the 
solution of the political problem by economic means is the most elegant 
solution, once one accepts Machiavelli's premise: economism is 
Machiavellianism come of age.”6 Strauss also attributes this “solution” to 
Burke, and through this critique he seems to take aim at those economic 
traditions of thought who hold that political order may arise 
“spontaneously” or without reliance on the conscious will of man.7 
These reflections were later indirectly recalled by Sheldon Wolin, who 
in 1969 wrote Politics and Vision, an important work on political theory. 8 
In the tenth chapter, entitled Liberalism and the Decline of Political 
Philosophy, Wolin paints an interesting picture of modern liberalism. He 
focuses on how Locke initiated a process that consigns the political 
element to an ever-narrowing space, concluding by identifying it simply as 
the minimum amount of coercion necessary to ensure social transactions. 
By conceiving of an order which, following the example of economics, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 
1953, p. 5.  
6 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? p. 49.  
7 In some passages Burke is criticised, but the criticism might be more 
appropriately addressed to Mandeville, see for example Strauss, Natural Right and 
History, pp. 314-15. 
8 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western 
Political Thought, New York, Little Brown and Co., 1960; Politics and Vision: 
Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, 2nd edition, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2006. 
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constitutes itself without coercion, he elaborates a “non-political model of 
society” out of which the modern crisis of political philosophy takes its 
origins.9 According to Wolin, the “lowering” of the tasks of philosophy 
begin with Locke; while classic political philosophers were aiming for the 
improvement of man, Locke relegates him to a “state of mediocrity” and 
limits the tasks and aims of political philosophy. Liberal political 
philosophy then became the philosophy of the limits of human capabilities 
and of the limits of political action. The consequence being that the 
purpose which it was supposed to aim for was no longer the achievement 
of the highest good and the good life, but instead the acquisition of a 
practical knowledge that allows the exploitation of the natural world in the 
aim of improving daily life. Basically, Locke reduced political philosophy 
to economics, a reduction characteristic of liberalism. 
Another philosopher studying the internal evolution of liberal tradition 
and trying to understand how and when it had lost its ethical references 
was John Hallowell. In The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology and in 
two following works, Hallowell articulates a position as that of a believer 
who identifies the cause of the great social and spiritual crisis of the 
modern world with the loss of faith in God. 10 
Hallowell reads the history of liberalism as a process of degeneration, 
distinguishing two types of liberalism: The first he calls “integral 
liberalism”, the liberalism of the origins, based on values held to be 
immutable and upon natural law. Integral liberalism is able to offer an 
unchanging standard of reference. It has its philosophical roots in ancient 
Greece, and its spiritual roots in Christianity, both clearly recognizable in 
the political conceptions of Locke and in the economic ideas of Smith. The 
fact that integral liberalism was historically dominant concealed its slow 
and gradual self-distancing from its Christian origins, in other words its 
“distancing from God”. By doing so this form of liberalism was opening 
the door to its own degeneration. In fact, already in the origins of 
liberalism, God is seen as the creator of the universe but no longer the 
“ruler”, since the universe is considered to have a sort of self-regulating 
mechanism where it is better to interfere as little as possible. 
According to Hallowell, the ideas of historicism and positivism marked 
the final degeneration of liberalism. Historicism had denied the law any 
universal content, since it was a “national” and historical product. 
Positivism exalted the scientific method – which was also applied to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “The decline of political categories and the ascendancy of social ones are the 
distinguishing marks of our contemporary situation where political philosophy has 
been eclipsed by other forms of knowledge”, Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 261. 
10 John H. Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology - with particular 
reference to German Political-Legal Thought, London, Kegan Paul, 1943; The 
Moral Foundation of Democracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1954; Main Currents in Modern Political Thought, New York, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1960. 
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social sciences – in order to discover universal laws not through the search 
for a cause but through a purely empirical process. The result was that the 
possibility of a substantive law based on universal truths was forever 
undermined, and law became a mere description of reality, without any 
concept of universal justice. With the rise of positivism there would be 
nothing left of the old integral liberalism, and through this process formal 
liberalism is definitively established.  
By considering this, Hallowell clearly questions the possibility of 
liberalism’s survival without reference to absolute values or to a natural 
law based on faith and reason, a theme developed with greater emphasis 
by Eric Voegelin. 11 
The idea of a crisis of political theory and of Western civilisation was, 
as mentioned, shared by many European thinkers. One of the most well-
known views on the subject originated in Cambridge and was expressed in 
1956 by Peter Laslett in the introduction to the essay collection 
Philosophy, Politics and Society. Here, Laslett recalled how the great 
works of political thought had often appeared in moments of crisis and in 
response to these moments, but after the tragedy of the World War there 
had not been any serious and original reflection on the foundations of 
political obligation. The tradition might one day be renewed, but “for the 
moment, anyway, political philosophy is dead”.12 Laslett clearly indicated 
who had “assassinated” political philosophy in his view: the Logical 
Positivists. Inspired by the method of the natural sciences, the logical 
positivists believed that a solution of philosophical problems could be 
found by combining empirical investigation and the analysis of language, 
and therefore philosophy should not be speculative but consist of 
empirically based knowledge. The logical positivists, with their refusal to 
accept the possibility that there may be a prescriptive political theory, had 
put an end to political philosophy. The idea at the base of their vision was 
that democracy had been consolidated to such an extent that it put an end 
to the discussions on the best political regime or on the foundations of 
authority and power, instead finding its legitimisation in the technical 
knowledge possessed by political science. 
This thesis was, in the next two collections of Laslett’s essays, 
gradually revised. In 1962, it was stated that political philosophy could not 
yet be considered resurrected, “but the mood is very different and very 
much more favourable”.13 The next collection, published in 1967, showed 
even greater optimism, referring to the work of John Rawls about the 
theory of justice, which “promises to be a major contribution to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1952.  
12 Peter Laslett (ed.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, First Series, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1956, p. vii. 
13 Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, 
Second Series, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. vii. 
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contemporary political philosophy.”14 Finally, in the fourth series in 1972, 
the “pathological metaphors” were no longer considered useful. The “old 
tradition” had been restored.  
Whether the death of classical liberal political philosophy had been 
ruled suicide (as per Hallowell) or murder (as per Laslett), the accepted 
explanation was that its disappearance was caused by the abandonment of 
references to universal values and principles. The reflection on the ethics 
and values that had characterised classical political philosophy had been 
left forgotten. Given the diffusion of this thesis, one might also explain the 
success of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,15 a work which again stresses 
emphatically – and with a certain solemnity – the ethical problems of 
defining (social) justice and organising a fair and just society. Therefore, it 
is perhaps possible to argue that when we proclaim political philosophy 
reborn in 1971 to some extent we are pursuing the argument that without 
“ethics” (in the broadest sense of the term) political philosophy cannot 
exist. 
 
 
Liberalism, Market and Morality 
 
In the 1870s, as a result of a long process, liberalism had achieved 
predominance in most European countries. Yet it was precisely in these 
years that it appeared to have finished its task and turned from a 
“universal” movement, able to embody the interests of the entire nation, 
into a bourgeois political party movement. The Great Depression of 1873-
96 challenged the confidence in the market’s ability to regulate itself, and 
perhaps more generally, jeopardised confidence in the market as the best 
way to produce wealth. 
The change in liberal theory was particularly clear in the United 
Kingdom.16 The first major change within liberal tradition came with 
Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism17, which introduced the idea that a 
rational reconstruction of society according to the principles of reason 
would be possible. Bentham’s idea was that the individual’s experience of 
pleasure and pain could be subject to measurement carried out by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third 
Series, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967, p. 1. In that collection Rawls published an 
essay entitled Distributive Justice, pp. 58-83. 
15 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1971. 
16 Interesting works on this topic are W.H. Greenleaf, The British Political 
Tradition: The Rise of Collectivism, London/New York, Meuthuen, 1983, and 
Shirley R. Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1998 
[1965]. 
17 See especially Jeremy Bentham, Fragment of Government, 1776, and 
Commentaries on the Law of England, 1765-69. 
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legislator, who would thus be able to realise, according to Bentham’s well-
known expression, “the greatest possible happiness of the greatest 
number”. This idea had very destabilising consequences for liberalism in 
the long term. 
 After Bentham, John Stuart Mill paved the way to New liberalism. 
Within Mill’s work the natural rights of individuals disappeared, and he 
made a distinction between the public and private sphere as well as 
between production and distribution of wealth. In Principles of Political 
Economy Mill proposed the use of “ethics laws” in the distribution of 
wealth, looking openly at socialist thought and at the use of the methods of 
the physical sciences to achieve an explanation of political phenomena. 18 
Mill’s idea that, once having been produced, the goods may be distributed 
as desired – ignoring roughly that redistribution has always a strong 
impact on future production and on individual freedom –  symbolised the 
tombstone of classical liberalism. 
The final act of this transformation was the new liberalism of T.H. 
Green.19 Green’s liberalism supported the idea that the state’s duty is to 
assist those who could not make it without such support, even though 
Green maintained confidence in the “old” liberal tenant of individual 
responsibility. Through Green, Britain was introduced to German idealism 
and the idea that individuals rights cannot exist except as rights that 
emerge in society, a clear reversal of Lockean reasoning. These theories 
would lead other proponents of new liberalism to identify the state as an 
ethical actor with specific moral obligations toward its citizens and cause 
the new liberals to advocate the concept of positive freedom.20 Due to this 
change, it is possible to understand why the members of the Fabian 
Society were also able to claim the label of liberal for themselves. 
Despite these massive changes, “old” liberalism was still a 
“bogeyman” that needed to be kept at a distance for many, even those 
thinkers who defined themselves as classical liberals. This was also true 
for one of the greatest figures in twentieth-century liberalism, Wilhelm 
Röpke. His writings contain many of the criticisms of liberalism that we 
have analysed in the first section, in particular the ideas that liberalism had 
been affected by rationalism and that it had been responsible for the ethical 
crisis of Western culture. According to Röpke, the market relies on extra-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 John S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, London, Longman, 1871. 
19 On New liberalism see Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of 
Social Reform, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978; Richard Bellamy, Rethinking 
Liberalism, London, Pinter, 2000; and David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, British 
Idealism and Political Theory, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2000. 
20 According to Hayek, “The decline of liberal doctrine, beginning in the 1870s, is 
closely connected with a reinterpretation of freedom as the command over, and 
usually the provision by the state of, the means of achieving a great variety of 
particular ends.” F.A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Economics and the 
History of Ideas, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 133.  
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economic conditions and the competition system requires moral and 
ethical qualities located outside the economy itself.21 At the foundations of 
the crisis of liberalism stood the “false use of reason” and the erroneous 
belief that it is possible to achieve a good social order only through appeal 
to reason, thus without a “safe spiritual orientation”. Liberalism became 
rationalistic when it had started to base the free market and the 
competition system on the “atomized” and completely free individual. It 
had become “doctrinaire” because it was no longer able to see the 
fundamental importance of the “frame” of the market economy, a frame 
which is legal-institutional but also cultural and ethical. Whilst not 
denying the value of the invisible hand mechanism, Röpke believed this 
mechanism, at least partially, a consequence of the ethical behaviour of 
people, behaviour which politics must promote. 
Röpke, in brief, tried to reform liberalism on the basis of "ethics". By 
doing so he was changing the real meaning of the invisible hand 
mechanism, which in his work seems to be the result of men's 
conscientious behaviour. This is a major change in classical liberal theory. 
In fact, even though every classical liberal could agree to the existence of 
shared moral values as an important requisite for the survival of a liberal 
society, for classical liberalism the social order is not based on moral 
values: Liberalism is an attempt to explain the possibility of social order 
not with reference to ethical criteria, but by through the natural 
compatibility and convergence of individuals pursuing their own interests. 
To paraphrase a famous sentence of Smith, we might say that the 
benevolence of the butcher and the brewer, who provide good products at 
the best price, does not affect the market mechanism (they may assist it) 
yet the revolutionary impact of liberal theory is precisely in the fact that 
benevolence is not necessary for the proper functioning of that 
mechanism. 
Here, the main issue with classical liberalism is how much importance 
is placed upon the invisible hand mechanism (the harmony of interests) 
and its fundamental role in the liberal tradition. If it is believed that a 
foundation in a pre-existing morality must exist, then liberalism has lost 
the capacity to explain the formation and preservation of the social order; 
the market order is no longer an example of how to form a social order and 
it is no longer a mechanism that – even if it requires favourable 
circumstances and occasional political intervention – places the free 
market economy as a specific case of a more general theory.22 Röpke’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See especially Wilhelm Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1950 [1942]; A Human Economy. The Social 
Framework of the free Market, Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1960 [1944]. 
22 For a comprehensive discussion on the importance and the (also moral) value of 
the free market economy, see Enrico Colombatto, Markets, Morals and Policy-
Making: A new defence of free-market economics, London/New York, Routledge, 
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position is emblematic: In his thinking, order – even civilisation itself – 
seems to depend upon a set of moral values that must exist in the human 
soul. They have nothing to do with man’s freedom to pursue his goals and 
interests. Moreover, Röpke saw freedom is a possibility only if those 
values were shared by all men. Only in a “good society” is the freedom of 
individuals possible, and the society is good only when all its individuals 
have accepted moral values. 
Ludwig von Mises was among the few “old liberals” of the inter-war 
period still advocating the historical merits and positive ethical 
consequences of classical liberalism, attributing the crisis of his time to an 
abandonment of liberalism.23 Mises saw that the market economy was 
creating a general wealth when it realised an “open society”, that is a 
dynamic society where each achievement might be questioned. However, 
many who had achieved wealth due to liberal society had then started 
calling for state intervention in order to protect them from the same 
competition mechanism that had previously rewarded them, now 
dismissing this competition as “inhuman”. Many liberal thinkers had the 
same attitude, Mises saw, looking to politics as a tool to limit the evils of 
the capitalist market and achieve a more humane capitalism. Mises, 
although not denying the existence of certain inhumane aspects of 
competition, never failed to reassert that wealth had been created by the 
market and only by the market. He continued to remind his reader that 
even the most humble worker in contemporary Western societies was 
living infinitely better than previous generations, and that this was only the 
case thanks to progress. But progress was not an independent variable for 
Mises; rather, it would not be achievable without freedom and the free 
market. 
It cannot be denied that Mises sometimes presented a utopian view of 
the market, treating it as the realm of equal freedom and equal opportunity, 
free from interference and conflict among individuals. However, other 
liberal thinkers might be criticised for making the opposite mistake: They 
were trying to place responsibility for societal problems on the mechanism 
of the market and sought the solution in massive political intervention 
aimed at transforming the market. By doing this, such liberals committed a 
serious error in reasoning, since this prescription precluded the possibility 
of examining the hypothesis that many of the sins attributed to the market 
were, in fact, the responsibility of politics. According to Mises, liberalism 
became distorted because it sought an increase in political power as the 
solution to “new” societal problems, thus ignoring the nature of liberalism 
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itself, that is, its roots as a theory on the limitations of political power. 
Liberalism had forgotten that the market and liberty were primarily 
creators of wealth, and it had begun to think that welfare could be obtained 
with an increase in redistribution. 
Another cause of the decline of liberalism was the excessive optimism 
of the old liberals. They had been convinced a priori that society would 
progress for the better, and that political and economic liberalism was the 
final conquest.24 This belief was based on the positive view of man’s 
ability to rationally recognise the best solution to social problems as 
offered by science. In this sense society did not have to fear the spread of 
wrong ideas, because after being examined by reasonable individuals they 
would soon be identified as erroneous. History had shown that this was not 
the case, that wrong ideas can triumph. The harmony of interests and the 
power of social cooperation, based on the division of labour, were for 
Mises the fundamental principles of liberalism, although they are 
principles that human reasoning might not always understand and easily 
agree upon.  
Thus, to “save” liberalism, “healthy ideologies” would be needed. The 
scientific process leading to the formulation of proper social and economic 
theories must be accompanied by the ability to spread and affirm those 
ideas, which must be accepted by intellectuals. Through their influence 
they would be accepted not only by governments but also by common 
people. Mises believed in the power of ideas, in the consequences of ideas, 
and despite his understandable pessimism in the face of historical events 
he never lost the conviction that the right ideas, sooner or later, would 
prevail. 
It may be interesting to compare this position with the position of 
Strauss. Mises’ idea was that if individuals are in the wrong, it is because 
they have failed to recognise their own interests and did not understand 
what he called the principle of the harmony of their interests. Liberal 
thinkers would have to work to make this principle better understood. 
Strauss’ belief was that individuals must be educated to virtue, and only 
this way they can overcome their animal nature. The schism then becomes 
one that exists between Mises’ harmony of interest and Strauss’ 
confidence in the fact that men can be educated by those who recognise 
the right values, conceiving this process as a sort of struggle against 
human nature. 
The different ideas of Strauss and Mises are well illustrated by liberal 
conceptions on the nature of the “Jewish problem” in Nazi Germany. We 
have seen Strauss’ idea, in which liberalism failed to curb the private 
discrimination that Germans carried out against the Jews – private 
discrimination which was then transformed into political discrimination. 
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Mises transforms that idea to suggest that no discrimination exists in the 
free market, or rather, the individual is free to discriminate, but this 
belongs under freedom of choice, not discrimination.25 The real 
discrimination can be realised only by political intervention, which 
promotes the interests of some to the detriment of others, as is the case 
with tariffs on foreign products, or e.g. by preventing Jewish access to 
certain professions. These discriminations have nothing to do with the free 
market and are in fact violations of consumer rights. The real 
discrimination can only exist where there are interventionist policies. For 
example, in order to implement discrimination against Jews in Nazi 
Germany laws were passed to prohibit the purchase of goods in Jewish-
owned stores.. These were enacted because other Germans continued to 
trade with Jews despite the campaign of hatred occurring. The actual 
discrimination was therefore not the result of racism, but of political 
interventionism.  
Mises ideas about the free market transcended a simple economic 
dimension. His defence of the free market is based on the belief that only 
free society can function despite its members disagreeing on certain value 
judgments; an idea of liberalism very different from Straussian definition 
of liberalism as the “solution of the political problem by economic 
means”. With Mises the idea that the cause of the crisis of the West should 
be found not in liberalism, but in its absence, began to emerge. Classical 
liberals claimed that to recover the true meaning of liberalism it was 
necessary to show how socialism and nationalism belonged in the same 
genus, how they were a negation of liberalism. It was necessary to 
demonstrate how they were political theories that, from the point of view 
of liberalism, had more consonances than differences. This idea was 
developed with works such as Omnipotent Government by Mises and The 
Road to Serfdom by Friedrich A. Hayek.  
According to Mises, totalitarianism is the logical consequence of the 
tendency of the government to manage all human problems.26 One of the 
main characteristics of totalitarianism was to abandon the market 
economy, that is, to abandon the idea that private social cooperation stands 
at the foundations of society. In their denial of social cooperation and its 
replacement through state organisations, all totalitarianisms appear similar, 
descended from a common origin, and among them only differences of 
degree exist. If there is no trust in the harmony of interests, whereby utility 
and morality ultimately coincide, an inevitable antagonism appears 
between individual and collective interests, and between nation and 
society as a whole. This antagonism is destined to cause conflict. 
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For Hayek, the key to interpreting Nazism is its continuity with the 
socialist mentality popular in Germany. Socialism is only a particular case 
of a more extensive category, collectivism. The rise of the collectivist 
mentality marked the end of liberalism and represented a real turning point 
in the conception of social order. To understand Hayek’s reflection, the 
role of the economy must first be understood as much more than just the 
production of goods and creation of wealth. According to him, personal 
and political freedom cannot exist without economic freedom, and there 
are no “purely economic” purposes distinct from the other purposes of life. 
This is why it is not possible to be free without economic freedom. If you 
are being controlled on “economic matters” you are being controlled in all 
aspects of life.27 
With their analysis of totalitarianism, Mises and Hayek raised the 
problem of the crisis of Western civilisation; a crisis rooted in positivism 
and historicism or, to use the Hayekian language, in scientism. These 
thinkers worked on important classical problems of political philosophy, 
such as justice, ethics and the right order, but in a very new and original 
way. Mises, for example, proposed an equation between justice and utility, 
based on the belief that only behaviour compatible with social cooperation 
could be considered just: 
 
“All ethical doctrines have failed to comprehend that there is, outside of 
social bonds and preceding, temporally or logically, the existence of 
society, nothing to which the epithet “just” can be given. […] In social 
cooperation with other men the individual is forced to abstain from 
conduct incompatible with life in society. Only then does the distinction 
between what is just and what is unjust emerge. It invariably refers to 
interhuman social relations. […] The ultimate yardstick of justice is 
conduciveness to the preservation of social cooperation. Conduct suited to 
preserve social cooperation is just, conduct detrimental to the preservation 
of society is unjust. There cannot be any question of organizing society 
according to the postulates of an arbitrary preconceived idea of justice. 
The problem is to organize society for the best possible realization of 
those ends which men want to attain by social cooperation. Social utility is 
the only standard of justice. It is the sole guide of legislation.”28 
 
The equation between right and social utility was also developed by 
Hayek. He defined free political systems as based on the rule of law, 
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formal and instrumental rules which do not realise the wishes of the people 
but make it possible to predict the consequences of human actions. 
Planned economies are opposed to these systems, because the rules have 
specific purposes – they are orders handed down by the government to 
individuals in order to shape society. For Hayek, the concept of justice 
coincides with impartiality. A rule is “right” when it permits people to 
make predictions about the behaviour of others, and when it can be used 
by unknown individuals for purposes that are not pre-given. The law does 
not have the task of realising the goals of individuals, but the task of 
empowering everyone to pursue their goals. Since the values and purposes 
of individuals are always different, a universal moral standard accepted by 
all cannot be achieved; there cannot be an agreed-upon criterion for 
planning and redistribution. This is why the only workable moral standard 
is supplied to us by competition. Competition is “right” because it is 
impartial and “blind” – it does not have the task of ensuring that the 
specific purposes of individuals are met, but rather the task of allowing 
everyone to pursue them.29 
In a sense, Mises and Hayek are inverting the classical concept of 
ethics, which sees justice as an attribute of state and law. For them, the 
idea that the state and its laws should have ethical content paves the way to 
totalitarianism. The issue is not what the moral values of the state are, but 
rather if the state can be the bearer of (any) morality. When the state 
enacts laws according to moral criteria, it signifies both the imposition of 
moral opinion on the public and the disappearance of the impartiality of 
the law. Since the moral values of men are different, and because there is 
no way to identify with certainty the content of a morality shared by all, a 
moral state and moral laws are no more than the imposition of morality of 
certain people upon others. Thus the state must not be moral, but it must 
be right, meaning impartial, not an instrument of moral content. The only 
just rules are those which enable people to live according to their own 
values and to pursue their own ends. 
Mises and Hayek both worked on justice, ethics and values, but from a 
completely different perspective from that of Strauss and the philosophers 
analysed in the first section, considering the idea that the state should 
implement ethical values a serious risk, whatever these values may be. 
Classical liberals as Mises and Hayek had criticised ideas of state based on 
ethical foundations, and it may be possible to suggest that they re-
articulated and incorporated classical notion of the good political order 
into a new and different framework: The idea of an impartial social order; 
a societal order which does not express ethical values, but which is “good” 
because it allows everyone to pursue what they think are right within a 
framework of formal rules that safeguard the equal rights of others. 
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Foundations of social order 
 
For a better understanding of classical liberalism’s answer to the problem 
of social order and its perspective on defending liberty, it is useful to 
distinguish between two outlooks on traditional political philosophy. 
The first comes from Thomas Hobbes, who finds the possibility of 
order only in “external power”, a problem that has to be taken seriously. 
Namely, it is the problem of “exasperated individualism”, which he saw as 
a political consequence of Lutheran theory. If every person has the right to 
follow his conscience through the free interpretation of the Holy Bible, 
everyone is the judge of right and wrong, between what is rational and 
what is not. However, in this situation individuals cannot mutually 
understand each other and communication becomes impossible. Thus, for 
Hobbes it is impossible to realise a social order beginning with 
individuals, and the solution is not to be found in human nature but in the 
“artifice”. By this, he means the politics of “objective reason” based on the 
fear of violence and death. 
What are the consequences of Hobbes’ theory? Basically, if order is 
generated by man, it is possible to modify it at will. The tradition of 
constitutionalism is not in direct contrast with the Hobbesian point of 
view, since Hobbes did not foresee the possibility of a separation of 
powers within society. Utilitarianism and democratic theory also accept 
the Hobbesian theory of order, albeit changing radically its form and 
realisation. There is a sovereign able to identify what is the common 
wealth, and it is the democratic sovereign (the people themselves) who 
governs and produces rules through the will of the people and in their 
interest. The wealth of the people is not, as in Hobbes, a power preventing 
the clash between different ideas of right and wrong, but an attempt to 
achieve “fairness”. There are different ideas about what is “fair”, but the 
idea that it is possible to reach this aim through politics is accepted. 
Following this theory of rational order produced by man, it is also possible 
to have “libertarian feelings”, yet theoretically there are no good 
arguments against redistribution and socialism, and it is possible to agree 
on the use of ethical criteria to redistribute the wealth that society is 
producing (for example, J.S. Mill or T.H. Green). 
The second outlook comes from Mandeville and is improved later by 
Carl Menger. It is the theory of the spontaneous order, which claims that 
the best social order cannot be created by man, but it is possible for men to 
discover if and when they are free.30 We cannot fix the best social order 
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and the good of society through majority decision or collective action, 
since this order is not rationally created by man. In Mandeville’s theory, 
cooperation between man is not imposed by rational choice but is a natural 
fact. This order departs from the limits of reason, by an evolutionary 
process which protects “universalizable” rules (the rules which make us 
capable of understanding and foreseeing the behaviour of other people) 
and eliminates other rules. In this process freedom is necessary, not 
incidental. Only when the process remains open is it possible to discover 
the best social order, since it is not rationally created but (non-consciously) 
discovered by free people. 
The rebirth of classical liberalism after the Second World War is based 
upon the rediscovery and implementation of this idea of spontaneous 
order. 
In Economics and Knowledge, Hayek expressed the idea that a system 
of individual liberty based on competition is capable – more so than any 
other system – of coordinating the actions and efforts of individuals. 31 
With this work, Hayek began to explain the consequences of the social 
order of his economic theory, taking a path that would mature in the 
following decades, passing to the study of political thought and legal 
philosophy. In his economic writings, he had come to the conclusion that a 
complex society based on the division of labour and on dispersed 
knowledge, only competition would be able to utilise the different 
knowledge of individuals efficiently. This mechanism of spontaneous 
coordination, discovered in economics, explains how a social order is 
possible, and makes up the very essence of classical liberal theory. 
Hayek located the collectivist mentality as the idea’s opposite; this is 
based upon the principle of organisation, a “total restructuring” of society 
which has profoundly changed Western civilisation and led to the 
replacement of liberal principles with collectivism and totalitarianism. The 
core of Hayek’s philosophy is the idea that not everything can be known 
and organised in a completely rational and conscious way, and the “forces 
of society” can therefore not be mastered. Dedicated to this theme is The 
Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Hayek 
describes scientism as the disastrous idea tasking the social sciences with 
the conscious control of society. Scientism represents the reversal of the 
true task of the social sciences: “[H]ow it is possible that institutions 
which serve the common welfare and are most important for its 
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advancement can arise without a common will aiming at their creation is 
still the significant, perhaps the most significant, problem of the social 
sciences.”32 
Hayek revitalises the strand of classical liberalism which has its first 
origin in The Fable of the Bees by Mandeville, a work that first presented 
a rudimentary form of the idea of the “unintentional” birth of social 
institutions. These institutions (language, market, money, morality, etc.) 
are seen as products of human action but not of an intentional design. It is 
certainly possible to improve rationally the institutions themselves, but is a 
mistake to think of replacing them with an organisation founded only on 
reason and conscious control. The process of civilisation is not the 
exclusive result of a conscious reason. It is a process in which individuals, 
who do not fully understand their role – or are unaware of the interactions 
of their knowledge – achieve something much greater than a single mind 
could achieve. 
An important part of twentieth century classical liberalism, the 
Austrian School has been largely responsible for reviving and rethinking 
the idea that the social order is not the product of human artifice but is 
instead the result of the actions of men who are not consciously directed 
towards that end. The process of production and selection of rules of 
coexistence is defined as a social process of discovery, called catallaxy. 
This process is well exemplified by the exchange of information through 
prices in the market, without forgetting that the market is just a special 
field of catallaxy. In such a context, the role of the state is mainly 
embodied in preserving order, punishing those who commit actions against 
the freedom of others, and to accelerate the transmitting of knowledge of 
rules that are created by the catallaxy process. Any other type of 
intervention seems in danger of altering the proper functioning of the 
process, just as government intervention in the economy make economic 
calculation impossible for agents.33 This is the main reason why the 
spontaneous social order is difficult to reconcile with the possibility of 
realising ethical objectives politically – among them social justice – 
through a process of collective decisions binding on the whole community. 
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The problem of order is seen as better solved by a selection process among 
social norms.34 
This explanation of order can be considered as one of the strongest 
philosophical foundations of liberalism. In fact, it is only when political 
order is seen as born from the spontaneous cooperation of free individuals 
that it can be assumed that the only real task of political power is 
safeguarding the freedom of individuals. What liberalism rediscovered in 
the twentieth century is the teachings of Hume and the classics: The task 
of the government is to maintain peace and order, not to pursue an ideal of 
justice. The search for morality and fairness belongs only to human beings 
(alone or associated in voluntary communities). The classical liberals 
denounce the idea of the “moral” role of politics and arrive at the 
conclusion that the model of unintentional formation of order is the only 
real guarantee of freedom, with moral and material progress depending 
only on individual freedom. Classical liberalism therefore represents an 
attempt to answer the question about what is the best political order, and 
why it must be based on individual freedom.  
What now remains is to deal with Leo Strauss’ criticisms and clarify 
why classical liberalisms model of order is not relativistic. Lastly, I will 
try to explain why the system of common law could be considered 
compatible with some of the aims set out by the supporters of natural law. 
In the first section we have seen how certain important political 
philosophers considered the main cause of the crisis of the West the 
attempt of liberalism to establish the social order on natural rights; an 
order which replaced duty (classic foundation of natural law) with 
individual rights. It was, according to Strauss, an attempt to build the 
“right order” starting with individual rights. But those rights were open to 
subjective interpretation, and from these different interpretations sprang 
relativism and nihilism.  
The question here is if those criticisms really address a model of 
spontaneous order. In fact, classical liberalism derives from the rejection 
of constructivism, the idea that man can built the political order. It is true 
that classical liberalism is not looking for natural law as understood by 
Strauss, but for the “subjective rights” that he was criticising. But then 
these rights are certainly not relativistic, because they can be guaranteed 
only if there is a precise form of political order – an order that allows all 
individuals to make their own choices with respect to law. In this kind of 
order nobody (not even political power) is allowed to use coercion, if not 
to make the protection of individual liberty.  
Such a model of order is therefore not compatible with a political 
regime that considers it lawful to decide what is good, because in this way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Raimondo Cubeddu, “The ‘Irrelevance’ of Ethics for the Austrian School”, 
in Peter Koslowski (ed.), Methodology of the Social Sciences, Ethics, and 
Economics in the Newer Historical School, Berlin, Springer, 1997, pp. 259-84. 
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the possibility to seek what an individual thinks is good disappears. In this 
sense, a good political regime is one that reduces collective choices to a 
minimum and employs coercion to a minimal degree. When these choices 
are reduced, what remains are the “good rules”, the rules which allow for 
the coexistence of different purposes. These rules are the “common good” 
that a society must have, the common good of a liberal society. 
The emergence of good rules can only be achieved whilst holding the 
rights to life, liberty and property, and the value of these rights cannot be 
determined by majority vote. Particularly an important point is the right to 
property, undoubtedly a key element of the classical liberal tradition. 
Thus, if this tradition can really be reduced to the “trinity” of life, liberty 
and property, is it possible to argue that the latter implicitly contains the 
other two. It is therefore important to understand why property is so 
essential in this tradition, and why its protection, especially today’s 
complex societies, can be seen as a way to resolve disputes and provide a 
common ground for dialogue. 
First we need to clarify exactly what classical liberalism considers the 
right to property. When Levellers (predating Locke) claimed that right as 
essential, this allowed every person to claim their right to the fruits of their 
work. The right to property was considered a logical extension of the right 
to one’s own ideas, one’s own body and their use. It was not so much a 
material dimension (possession) as the possibility of identifying a sphere 
of individual autonomy, which, if recognised, provides equality before the 
law and prevents discrimination. The equal right of every person to be the 
holder of property was a way of claiming equality before the law and 
overcoming caste privileges. It was a way of resolving disputes and 
preventing religious discrimination, e.g. the fact that some religions were 
prevented certain types of business came to be considered a violation of 
the right to property. It also gave rise to the freedom to express one’s own 
ideas, such the right to print religious texts. Declaring the “sacred and 
inviolable” right of property was a way to proclaim the equality of rights 
and make inviolable the freedom of the individuals. Property was thus 
understood as a function of freedom, depending on the definition of a 
sphere inviolable by other men – and therefore also by collective decisions 
– and able to guarantee the coexistence of people with differing ways of 
life and religious beliefs. 
Therefore, when a liberal political system enforces property rights, it is 
protecting and promoting the values of tolerance, which is perhaps the 
main characteristic of liberalism.35 Since the respect for property creates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, pp. 68-69: “‘Tolerance’ is perhaps the only word 
which still preserves the full meaning [of freedom]”; Mises, Liberalism, p. 34: 
“Liberalism demands tolerance as a matter of principle, not from opportunism. It 
demands toleration even of obviously nonsensical teachings, absurd forms of 
heterodoxy, and childishly silly superstitions. It demands toleration for doctrines 
and opinions that it deems detrimental and ruinous to society and even for 
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an environment in which tolerance may flourish, Strauss’ criticism that 
liberalism cannot prevent private discrimination – with the inevitable 
consequence of the degradation of all forms of virtue, ending in 
totalitarianism – seems unfounded.  
Finally we may investigate the relationship between classical 
liberalism and natural law, keeping in mind that for Strauss and other 
thinkers the main fallacy of liberalism was the abandonment of natural 
law. It is quite surprising to realise that in the works of Hayek one finds a 
criticism of modern natural law not so distanced from the criticism made 
by Strauss. When Hayek, considering the rule of law, criticises “reason” 
and “natural law”, he does so because the meaning of these two concepts 
have been changed completely: 
 
““Reason”, which had included the capacity of the mind to distinguish 
between good and evil, that is between what was and what was not in 
accordance with established rule, came to mean a capacity to construct 
such rules by deduction from explicit premises. The conception of natural 
law was thereby turned into that of a “law of reason” and thus almost into 
the opposite of what it had meant. This new rationalistic law of nature of 
Grotius and his successors, indeed, shared with its positivist antagonists 
the conception that all law was made by reason or could at least be fully 
justified by it, and differed from it only in the assumption that law could 
be logically derived from a priori premises, while positivism regarded it 
as a deliberate construction based on empirical knowledge of the effects it 
would have on the achievement of desirable human purposes.”36 
 
Hayek was not opposed to the use of reason, but, as the subtitle of his 
book clarifies, to the “abuse of reason”. The proper use of reason lay in 
the capacity to recognise the rules that best serve the needs of the social 
order, rules which are not necessarily created by human will and therefore 
by reason itself, but which emerge in a long process as the best solutions 
to solve problems and disputes. Extending this Hayekian attitude to the 
problem of natural law it may be argued that he was not opposing to a 
properly understood natural law, because he saw nature closely linked to 
the concept of evolution, as it appears clearly in the first volume of Law, 
Legislation and Liberty. In this regard, it is interesting what he wrote in his 
final book, The Fatal Conceit. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
movements that it indefatigably combats. For what impels liberalism to demand 
and accord toleration is not consideration for the content of the doctrine to be 
tolerated, but the knowledge that only tolerance can create and preserve the 
condition of social peace without which humanity must relapse into the barbarism 
and penury of centuries long past.” 
36 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, New York, Routledge, 1973, 
p. 21. 
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“The original meaning of the Latin root of “natural”, as well as the Greek 
root of its equivalent “physical”, derive from verbs describing kinds of 
growth […] so that it would be legitimate to describe as “natural” 
anything that has grown spontaneously and not been deliberately designed 
by a mind. In this sense our traditional, spontaneously evolved morals are 
perfectly natural rather than artificial, and it would seem fitting to call 
such traditional rules “natural law”.”37 
 
In this way we can see Hayek as a defender of a kind of natural law, 
possibly framed as a result of human evolution.38 Hayekian natural law is 
similar to the common law of Edward Coke and William Blackstone, who 
saw it as a result of the use of human reason in historical process, in which 
natural law is carried out. Only history can tell us when human reason is 
right in recognising natural law and when it is wrong. Human reasoning 
can always fail, and we cannot shape reality by using only reason.39 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, W.W. Bartley (ed.), New York, Routledge, 
1988, p. 143.  
38 The relation between Hayek’s ideas and natural law is explored by Erik Angner, 
Hayek and Natural Law, New York, Routledge, 2007; and by Charles Covell, The 
Defence of Natural Law, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1992. 
39 The Italian jurist Bruno Leoni was proposing a recovery of common law, the law 
created by judges, in opposition to legislation, the law produced by parliament. He 
was doing it also suggesting to consider the common law as an “empirical” 
reinterpretation of the theories of natural law. In a private letter to Hayek, sent on 
27 July 1965, Leoni wrote: “It would probably be worthwhile to trace back to 
Coke the concept of “artificial” employed by Hume and contrasted by him with 
that of “arbitrary” rules. Coke used to say that common law is due to artificial 
reason, as contrasted with natural reason. What he obviously meant (against 
Hobbes and James the first) was that the use of reason in abstracto is not sufficient 
to work out the legal rules as Hobbes and James the first (a disciple of Hobbes on 
this matter) maintained.” Leoni’s idea is interesting because it is potentially 
capable of “defusing” conflict when different people, using their subjective 
reasoning, discover different natural laws. Leoni was very influential on Hayek, 
but unfortunately the premature decease interrupted his reflection. He was also a 
mindful scholar on Greek legal thought. His studies on this topic were known by 
Hayek, who mention them in Leoni’s commemoration in Pavia, in 1968; see F.A. 
Hayek, “Bruno Leoni the Scholar”, in The Fortunes of Liberalism – The Collected 
Works of F. A. Hayek, IV, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1992, pp. 253-58, 1992. We 
can argue that Hayek developed Leoni’s ideas in the first volume of Law, 
Legislation and Liberty, where, by the way, Leoni is not quoted on this issue. On 
Leoni see Antonio Masala, Il liberalismo di Bruno Leoni, Soveria Mannelli, 
Rubbettino, 2003; and Carlo Lottieri, Le ragioni del diritto. Libertà individuale e 
ordine giuridico nel pensiero di Bruno Leoni, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2006.  
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After the Second World War, a “rebirth” of classical liberalism was 
introduced, that is, a rediscovery of the liberal tradition which has its 
philosophical assumptions in the concepts of spontaneous order as well as 
in the rights of property in the Lockean sense. This form of liberalism and 
its philosophical foundation had gradually, since the mid-nineteenth 
century, suffered a loss of interest and attractiveness in favour of a 
different liberalism aimed at making “good order” on the basis of ethical 
criteria, which must necessarily be imposed upon the whole of society.  
Classical liberalism was reborn through the Austrian School and 
confronted with the problem of the foundation of a “good society”, seeks 
an answer to the classic question of political philosophy: What is the best 
political regime? This attempt was not always understood and sufficiently 
appreciated, perhaps due to its extremely innovative and original approach 
to understanding and dealing with some of the classic issues of political 
philosophy, such as law, justice, ethics and freedom. In this originality and 
this attempt to innovate “classical” solutions it is possible to see the 
importance of the contribution of classical liberalism in the twentieth 
century. It is also worth considering whether the revival of the discussions 
on such questions might be more usefully based on the Austrian liberalism 
(in its different branches) or the Rawlsian project, which was itself 
reviving, once again, the prospect of a rational morality able to build a 
form of universal civilisation. 
However, classical liberalism does not believe that civilisation – or 
simply life within society – can be constructed by “rational morality”, but 
instead believes that it is based on the idea that good political order is the 
unintentional result of individual actions and choices. It emerges and 
changes from a continuous process of discovery, which must always 
remain open, since only in a system which protects and enhances 
individual freedom is it possible to find the best solutions.  
A society that is truly respectful of human diversity is not a society 
organised and regulated according to one single understanding of morality, 
a society that aims to satisfy the desires of every single person; it is – 
perhaps more modestly – a society where people are free to live according 
to their principles yet accept that these principles cannot be imposed on 
others. If it is impossible to defend and promote the idea of this kind of 
society, and the principles of tolerance and freedom that give it substance, 
we simply have to admit that the only other solution is the prevalence of 
the will of the majority on every aspect of life, and entrust to a process of 
collective choices the selection of the good moral values for society as a 
whole. 
This is certainly not the perspective of political philosophy, or at least 
not the perspective of classical liberalism, which excludes coercion – even 
if approved by the majority – as the solution to the problem of achieving 
the best political order. 
	  
